A Lost Alliance: Polish-Georgian Diplomatic Relations and the Intermarium (1918-1921)

Abstract

This article examines the attempts to establish a military-political alliance between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Poland during the years 1918-1921 within the framework of Józef Piłsudski's geopolitical concept of the Intermarium. It analyses how the strategic interests of Poland and Georgia intersected with Józef Piłsudski's federalist vision and what place Polish-Georgian military-political cooperation occupied within this geopolitical concept. Particular attention is devoted to the diplomatic mission of Tytus Filipowicz in the spring of 1920 as the most significant initiative aimed at establishing military-political cooperation. The study demonstrates that the failure of this initiative resulted from a combination of interconnected military, geopolitical, and logistical factors, including the shift in Poland's foreign policy priorities following Poland's victory in the Battle of Warsaw, the absence of effective international security guarantees, the expansion of Bolshevik Russia into the South Caucasus, and the difficulties of both land and maritime communications. The article concludes that, despite the converging strategic interests of Georgia and Poland, these circumstances made it impossible both to establish a military-political alliance and to implement military-political cooperation with Georgia at the state level within the framework of the Intermarium concept.