“REVERSE MIGRATION” AND GEORGIA'S SECURITY DILEMMA AMIDST RUSSIAN AGGRESSIVE WAR IN UKRAINE

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Abstract. After the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation’s troops into Ukraine, the analysis of the statistical data of the border crossing of Georgia shows that the number of Russian and Belarusian citizens staying in Georgia has increased significantly. Moreover, most of them did not leave the country after staying for at least 1-3 months. Therefore, it is unlikely that the visits of the mentioned persons are related to the tourist goals. Simultaneously, the discussion about "soft threats" is becoming active. It is likely that, both in the short and long term, this process will have an impact on certain issues related to security. Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze whether this situation represents a real threat to state security and how the state should respond to a potential challenge.

Due to the relevance of the topic, in the given article authors discuss the main tasks of Georgia's foreign policy and evaluate the perspective of whether Georgia can pursue its state interests, which are closely related to national and global security, or not. The article depicts activities and functions of international organizations as well. A significant amount of attention is paid to the policies of the target countries of future migration flows to Georgia (in particular, the European Union and Russia).

Keywords: Russian War in Ukraine, Sanctions, Migration, Hybrid Warfare, Balance of trade.

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Introduction. The national security concept of any state is typically based on an analysis of interests and values, as well as domestic and foreign threats and challenges, resulting in an authoritative determination of political priorities. The concept of national security of Georgia is close to a standard pattern: a description of the country's security environment is followed by a discussion of national values and interests. Then, it proceeds to threats, challenges, and opportunities, concluding with a list of priorities. However, the post-Soviet experience - internal political instability has repeatedly shown us how large the area of invisible threats is, which manifests itself in different forms at different times in the country's development or stagnation. The new reality emerging in the world today turns the current political processes into a multifaceted dilemma. The fact is that the so-called Against the background of "asymmetrical challenges", foreign appropriately achieving policy goals and objectives, including overcoming the challenges and problems facing the state (especially migration issues) is determined by "smart", "hard" and "soft power", the only essential is to identify and take preventive steps.

After the invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, the analysis of the statistical data of the border crossing of Georgia shows that the indicators of Russian and Belarusian citizens staying in Georgia have increased significantly. Moreover, most of them did not leave the country after a delay of at least 1-3 months. Therefore, it is unlikely that the visits of the mentioned persons are related to the tourist goals. Against this background, the discussion about "soft threats" is becoming active. It is likely that, both in the short and long term, this process will have its impact on certain issues related to security. Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze whether this situation represents a real threat to state security and how the state should respond to a potential challenge.

Methodology. Methodologically, article adopts a qualitative research design and employs the case study method as its principal methodological framework. Data collection and analysis are grounded in a systematic review of secondary sources and relevant scholarly literature related to the research problem, thereby establishing a robust theoretical and empirical foundation for the study. This approach ensures the scientific rigor and academic relevance of the findings.

The empirical material includes official statements, policy documents, and public speeches issued by international organizations, as well as by the ministries of foreign affairs of Georgia, Russia, and other states. The study also draws on Georgian and international print media, peer-reviewed academic publications, research conducted by Georgian scholars, and materials obtained from electronic media sources.

In addition, expert interviews were conducted as a complementary qualitative method, contributing to the refinement of the research questions and the generation of new analytical insights. The study applies economic and political analytical frameworks to test the proposed hypothesis and to examine the degree of alignment between the theoretical assumptions articulated in the article and the empirical evidence.

Security and Economic Impact of Russia’s Aggressive War Against Ukraine – Nexus Migrations, and “Strange Refugees” From Russia to Georgia

It is widely recognized that stabilization of the economic environment cannot be achieved without political stabilization, and war represents the most severe form of instability. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is not only an aggressive war against Ukraine but also against the entire civilized world that upholds basic norms of international law and justice. Consequently, most countries have responded by providing economic and military assistance to Ukraine and imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on the Russian Federation. However, “divorce” in the strategic economic relations with Russia was not easy for the EU and generally for the West. 40% of natural gas and 27% of oil products imported into the European Union came from Russia, as a result of which the Russian Federation received 400 billion euros from the European Union every year. (BCC, 2022). Thus, During the decades after the end of the Cold war inexpensive Russian energy resources increased dependence on Russia’s energy, as well as determined the EU’s “soft” reactions regarding the Kremlin’s aggressive revisionist politics, violation of international norms, and use of hard power against neighboring countries (5 days war against Georgia in August 2008, annexation of Crimea 2014, military buildup in the Black Sea, etc.).

However, , the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops on 24 February 2022, became a turning point in terms collapse of Post Bipolar European security architecture and strategic economic relations between Russia and Europe. In response to the aggression, Euro-Atlantic states and their partners and international institutions cut off bilateral and multilateral political and economic relations, imposed total economic sanctions, and suspended or excluded Russia's voting rights and even membership in international organizations. Finally, the decades-long bilateral and multilateral relations between Russia and Western countries in economic, political, military-strategic, and cultural fields have collapsed. It can be said that relations and the index of trust between Russia and the West have fallen to the pre-1991 level. (Lasha Bazhunaishvili, 2022).

Table 1. Share of gas supply from Russia in Europe in 2021, by selected country



Source: (Department, 2023)

Russia's aggressive created not only a perilous situation in the European Region, but exposed critical vulnerabilities in the global economy as well. According to an article published in the WSJ, based on an OECD (OECD) forecasting study, Russia's invasion of Ukraine would cost the world's global economy $2.8 trillion, and more if energy prices remain volatile over the winter. However, according to the latest OECD forecast, the growth of the global economy was reduced from 4.5% to 3% by 2022, and by 2023 to 2.2% from 3.2%. (WSJ, 2022). War also triggered shortage of energy, trade and investment sectors, which caused inflation **(See Table 1).** Despite the fact that in most of the countries in the presented table, inflation and the refinancing rate have increased even more than in the Russian Federation, the fact is that the sanctions are working on Russia and the results will be even more difficult. In the advanced economies (USA, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, etc.), the inflation rate is at the historical maximum in recent years and the refinancing rate is increasing, but the consolidation of the countries in relation to the Russian sanctions is still maintained, and this process also accelerates the process of replacing Russian energy resources. With the security risks and economic difficulties the war also triggered migration process across the EU and in the wider Black Sea region as well. It is essential that due to aggressive and Barbaric war, Ukrainians were forced to leave the country due to Russia's missile attacks against living areas, mass massacres of civilians in the occupied territories, and violations of the rights of peaceful Ukrainians. But the war in Ukraine also caused another "strange migration" from Russia to the neighboring countries, especially in Georgia. The wartime migration of Russians to Georgia has an economic and security impact on Georgia, which is measurable with economic parameters.

Table 1. Statistical indicators of the countries

Country	GDP YoY, %	Interest rate, 01.2022	Current interest rate, 2023	Inflation rate, 01.2022	Current inflation rate, 2023
USA	1.8	0.25%	5.0%	7.5%	6.0%
China	3.9	3.7%	3.65%	0.9%	1.0%
Japan	0.9	-0.1%	-0.1%	0.5%	3.3%
Germany	1.2	0.0	3.5%	4.9%	7.4%
United Kingdom	4.4	0.5%	4.25%	5.5%	10.4%
India	13.5	4.0%	6.5%	6.01%	6.44%
France	1	0.0	3.5%	2.9%	5.6%
Italy	0.5	0.0	3.5%	4.8%	7.7%
Canada	0.8	0.25%	4.5 %	5.1%	5.2%
South Korea	3.1	1.0%	3.5 %	3.6%	4.2%
Australia	0.9	0.10%	3.6 %	2.2%	7.8%
Brazil	3.2	10.0%	13.75%	10.38%	5.6%
Russia	-4.1	8.5%	7.5%	8.73%	11.00%
Turkey	7.6	14.0%	8.5%	48.69	50.51%
Ukraine	-37.20	10.0%	25.0%	10.0%	24.9%
Azerbaijan	51.19	7.4%	8.75%	12.5%	14.10%

Source: (ECONOMICS, TRADING ECONOMICS, 2023)

Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has been shaped by several interrelated factors, including geographical proximity and the historical legacy of economic interdependence inherited from the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Long-standing integration into Russia’s market structures, combined with technological and infrastructural linkages developed during these periods, contributed to the persistence of asymmetric economic ties between the two countries. From Russia’s perspective, maintaining a dominant economic position in Georgia serves not only economic interests but also geopolitical objectives. Trade and economic relations have therefore been used as instruments of political pressure, providing Russia with a permanent tool to pursue political and geostrategic goals. However, asymmetric economic relations and their impact on the political relations of Russia and Georgia have been permanently changing. n the early years of Georgia's independence, which were characterized by political instability and economic crisis, the country’s economic dependence on Russia was largely shaped by historical trade ties, energy supply reliance, and the legacy of Soviet-era industrial and infrastructural integration. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia faced severe shortages of essential goods, a disrupted industrial base, and an underdeveloped domestic energy sector, which made Russian markets and energy resources a crucial lifeline. Moreover, long-standing trade relationships and supply chains that had developed during the Soviet period were difficult to replace or diversify in the short term. As a result, despite political tensions, economic pragmatism compelled Georgia to maintain close economic links with Russia, reinforcing asymmetric dependencies that would persist into the subsequent decades. But after the “Rose Revolution”, when new Western-style leadership of Georgia leading by then-President Mikheil Saakashvili expand Georgia’s Economic and political ties with Western countries and actively emphasized Georgia’s transit capacity as an alternative to Russia’s controlled transit routes, economic relations between Georgia and Russia collapsed. Russia imposed several trade sanctions, a ban on importing goods from Georgia, and even an energy blockade via explodes main gas supply pipeline, and deported a large number of Georgian worker migrants from Russia. After the 2012 elections, when pro-Russian Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and its controlled Georgian Dream party captured power, Georgia’s asymmetric economic dependence on Russia (meaning trade and investments) grew again.

Parallel to the growing economic and energy dependence on Russia Georgian Dream government start slow shift from the West to Russia. AT the first time Georgian Dram Government successfully implemented EU integration requirements, but slightly distanced from NATO and stated that from this point its politics regarding to the Russia will base on a “non-irritation” strategy. Since “non-irritation” and appeasement strategy does not give any tangible affects and illegal “Borderization” of occupied territories by Russia went unstoppable *the Georgian Dream* Government changed its approaches (Arladiusz Modrzejewski, 2025). On May 30, 2023, at the Global Security Forum in Bratislava at Thematic Discussion with Justin Voog Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili **stated that** “in foreign policy, we (the *Georgian Dream Party*) established the doctrine of “**Strategic Patience”** due to which Georgia managed to secure peace and stability (PM: NATO Enlargement “One of the Main Reasons for Ukraine War”, 2023).

After the war outbreak, Ivanishvili controlled the Georgian Dream Government surprisingly took a different, even contradictory stance. Governmental messages, statements to the press and opinions expressed at international forums were particularly unfriendly. Commenting on the Georgian media, then-Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili noted, "*I have my work to do... The war is in Ukraine... Kyiv is being bombed, and no one can stop it..."* (Kupreishvli, 2022) Georgia declared that it would not join the sanctions imposed on Russia for the two main reasons: Anti-Russian Sanctions would threaten the security and national interests of Georgia, and second, sanctions were ineffective, and they weren’t working. Meanwhile, Georgia opened its doors wide to Russian migrants “fleeing” the economic hardships caused by the war and sanctions. Georgia became one of the important loopholes for Russia to avoid sanctions in critical areas. The U.S. State Department officials, including **James O’Brien, head of the sanction’s coordination office,** identified several neighboring countries, including Georgia, as areas where **sanctions evasion routes might be exploited.**

Consequently, Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia significantly increased, especially in the areas of direct investments, energy, trade, and money transfers. Diagram 2 shows that as a result of increased migration from Russia after 2022 the amount of transfers increased, and from Ukraine, on the contrary, decreased.



Source: (GEORGIA N. B., 2023)

For example, if in February 2022 the amount of transfers from Russia amounted to only 27 million US dollars, in February 2023 it reached to 187 million dollars, while the highest transfer from Russia after the start of the war was recorded in the month of December 2022 and amounted to 317 million dollars, of course, at the expense of the inflow of such cash flows, the demand for the national currency increased from the side of the emigrants, which became the main determining factor for the strengthening of the GEL. In total, the amount of transfers from Russia over the last year reached $2.4 billion, which is a record figure, in addition, by looking at the diagram, we can conclude that the analysis of the data from the beginning of the war to the present shows that the peak of transfers from the Russian Federation in Georgia has been passed and we should expect a decrease. This is also indicated by the Asian Development Bank report, which suggests that: "Total remittances in Georgia will decrease to 2.5 billion USD by 2023, as the inflow of migrants decreases, which will likely lead to pressure on the exchange rate." (BANK, 2023)

Also, it is important at the expense of increasing migration opening bank accounts by non-residents in resident commercial banks of Georgia and increase the volume of deposits of non-residents.

Diagram 3. The volume of deposits of non-residents in Georgia, according to national and foreign currencies, 2017-2022



Source: (Georgia N. B., Interactive Statistics, 2023)

As can be seen from the diagram 3, the volume of non-resident deposits increased by 48% in 2022 compared to 2021, which is much higher than in previous years, and it is also worth noting that the volume of foreign currency deposits increased by a greater proportion - about 50%, what makes it more difficult to overcome the de-dollarization process, which is unfortunately a challenge for Georgia, in particular, the increase the volume of foreign currencies placed on deposits gives commercial banks more opportunities to finance banking activities in foreign currencies, What increases the dollarization of the economy through the multiplier effect, it is clear that by itself, the majority of funds transferred from the Russian Federation, which will be deposited in resident banks of Georgia or cashed out by their owners, may not be directly integrated into the economy, but a large share of such funds are still accumulated in the formation of the gross domestic product of Georgia, in particular, it can be the financing of personal consumption expenses, which is manifested in the purchase/renting of housing, financing of daily household expenses, and others. To reveal such a connection, we present information about the number of people entering Georgia in 2022 and real estate prices.

Diagram 4. The top six countries and the European Union by the number of border crossings, 2022



	Russian federation	Turkey	Armenia	EU countries	Israel	Ukraine	Azerbaijan
2021	291511	358014	218349	155664	111461	168961	97161
2022	1459541	1030199	1018771	292084	237246	223697	188145

Source: (Affairs, 2023)

As the chart shows, the number of inflows from the Russian Federation increased by 41%, while the increase in the number of inflows from Russia during 2021 was only 27% (from 229,692 to 291,511 in 2021). This process is logical, because it is dictated by the outcome of the war and the declaration of partial mobilization in the Russian Federation, as evidenced by the statistical data on the crossing of the border of foreign citizens who have moved to the state border of Georgia by age and gender, for example, men 31-45 years prevail and their number is much higher than the number of women.

Diagram 5. Statistical data of the crossing of the border of citizens of foreign countries moved to the state border of Georgia by gender and age, 2022





Source: (Affairs, 2023)

In contrast to the Russian inflow in Georgia, there is a high rate of immigration of Georgians to the US and European countries. In the 2021-2022 period, the border crossing rate of Georgian citizens in terms of entry and exit is negative, i.e. more leave than enter, for example, in 2021, 749,322 left and 710,327 entered, and in 2022, 2,422,849 left and 2,378,262 entered. In addition, it is worth noting the fact that 31-45 years lead the age group of Georgian citizens who left Georgia, which will affect the reduction of the workforce, if, of course, it cannot be compensated at the expense of the inflow of replaceable labor force (in the citizens of a foreign country mainly mean migrants from Russia during of the war), in addition, a negative natural increase (the difference between the number of live births and deaths) was recorded in Georgia, and it was determined by -6,799 units (in 2022, the number of live births was 42,319, and the number of deaths was

49,118). (GEORGIA N. S., 2023) In addition, it should be noted that in 2023 the migration balance worsened and amounted to - 39,207, which, together with the process of natural reduction of the population, worsens the demographic situation, and this increases political risks among them, in terms of the Georgian population remaining in the ethnic minority in the future (in 2022, the migration balance was positive and amounted to 54,509, mainly due to the influx of population from the Russian Federation).

Along with the influx of population from Russia to Georgia, It is logical that important economic parameters would begin to adjust, even at the expense of increased supply and demand, especially in the real estate and services market. For example, according to the data of September 2022 (meaning from January 1, 2022 to September 9, 2022), more than 12,000 Russian citizens purchased more than 15,000 real estate, of which more than 13,000 are residential apartments, and up to 14,000 plots of land were purchased by up to 11,000 citizens of Russia, registered as property. As for the past years, in 2020, 2,366 Russian citizens owned 2,701 real estates, and in 2021, 3,739 citizens owned 4,332 real estates. (ambebi.ge, 2023)

Table 2. Migration

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Net migration, persons	-8,060	-2,212	-10,783	-8,243	15,732	-25,966	54,509	**-39,207**
Net migration rate per 1,000 persons	-2,2	-0,6	-2,9	-2,2	4,2	-7,0	14,7	**-10,6**

Source: (Georgia N. s., 2024)

In addition, the increase in demand from non-residents led to an increase in the price of real estate, for example, according to the 4th quarter of 2022 of the Statistics Service, in the market of new residential real estate in the city of Tbilisi, the increase in the weighted average value of both multi-story houses (apartments) and private houses amounted to 14.3% during the year, and 24% compared to 2020 (see Table 3).

Table 3. Residential Real Estate Price Index (RPPI), Tbilisi, 4th quarter, 2023

Index	**compared to the 2020 average, %**	**compared to the previous quarter**	**compared to the corresponding quarter of the previous year, %**
total RPPI	39,8	2,9	12,8
apartments	37,9	2,5	14,2
private houses	43,1	4,3	8,6

Source: (GEOSTAT.ge, 2024)

According to the data published by the Statistics Service, in the 4^{th} quarter of 2024, the price of apartments (in GEL) according to the condition (frames) looks like this:

- Green frame - 3,350 GEL
- White frame - 2,875 GEL
- Black frame - 2,629 GEL

It should be noted that the increase in real estate prices did not affect only the city of Tbilisi, but also Georgia as a whole and especially the city of Batumi due to the increase in tourism potential. In fact, together with the inflows, the demand for apartment rents also increased, which was reflected to the price, for example, according to the research of "TBC Capital", in the 10 months of 2022, compared to the previous October 2021, the rent price increased by 120%, and according to the same research, the rent price will increase by 28% and the price of real estate by 18% in 2023. (www.kvirispalitra.ge, 2023)

Factors resulting from migration processes can be considered in a positive and negative context. For example, on the one hand, price increases, purchasing power demand is perceived by producers as an additional incentive for the expansion of production and price increases, but it is difficult to measure what effect this will have on the local population in general. For the sake of correctness, it should be noted that inflation is a challenge not only for Georgia, but for the whole world; moreover, the size of inflation in Georgia is moderate at this stage.

Based on the discussion and summary of the data discussed above, we can assume that the inflow of cash, the increase in the volume of trade, and the increased flow of travelers would lead to the correction of macroeconomic indicators. To present a comparative analysis according to the beginning of the year and the current situation, see Table 7.

Diagram 7. Foreign trade of Georgia, export-import volume, 2023, (million USD)



Source: (Service, 2024)

As can be seen from the table, even though the economic growth is higher than planned, at the same time, the national exchange rate is strengthened. It is essential that this was due to the inflow of money transfers from Russia and visitors (mainly emigrants from Russia). Besides the facts that lot of money were inflowed to the Georgia some economic parameters worsened rather improved. I.e. the level of unemployment is still high, the rate of refinancing has increased, and the inflation rate is close to double digits, which is an additional burden (cost) to the population of Georgia. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that increased inflation is a characteristic of the world's leading and trade partner countries of Georgia. For example, there is 50% inflation in Turkey and 14% in Azerbaijan, which in itself affects the cost of goods imported to Georgia. The neutralization of relative prices is provided by the effect of the national currency exchange rate and the refinancing rate, which at this stage is definitely aimed at reducing inflation and stimulating exports. But we understand that the current geopolitical situation is one-time in nature, but its impact will be relatively strategic for those countries which have the potential to represent us as a partial or complete substitute for the Russian market.

Table 7. Some macroeconomic indicators of Georgia during the Russia-Ukraine war

	01.2022 year	2022	2023,*	2021 year
Economic Growth	forecast 6%	11%	7.5	10%
Inflation rate, real	13,9%	11.9%	2.5%	13,9%
Refinance rate	10,5%	11%	9%	8-10,5%
Exchange rate of the national currency against the US dollar	3,07	2.68 (12.2022)	2,65	-3,27
unemployment rate	19,4%	17,3%	15.3%	20,6%

Note: to be specified, not final data, according to the https://www.geostat.ge/en

Conclusions. Inflow of migrants from Russia and a huge number of immigration of Georgians to the EU and USA create challenges for Georgia's security

- Inflow from Russia and at the same time, with the outflow of Georgian citizens, employment at the local level of the workforce is at risk. It is obvious that the majority of Georgian citizens going abroad for work purposes, while since the majority of those who came from Russia have to stay in Georgia for a long time (more than 3 months) and they will automatically start looking for a job, which increases competition for employment of Georgian citizens.
- the price of real estate and rent increased significantly due to migration. I some case increasing proces are profitable for owners, but generally it has a negative impact on the locals who want to buy or rent real estate (the high purchasing power of migrants compared to the local population puts them at an advantage, and the financing of such purchases is less by Georgian citizens).
- Against the background of the war, the reduction of export and import from Russia should be done periodically, As this market is considered the most unstable for Georgia, past experience is enough as evidence, for example, the imposition of an economic embargo on Georgia by Russia in 2007 caused significant damage to the Georgian economy in general, and mineral water and wine producers were especially affected (economic relations with Russia have not been fully restored to this day, and Russia has not yet lifted the visa regime for Georgian citizens).
- Diversification of markets should be done periodically, Even in terms of export of traditional goods for us, because if the war continues, the restriction of trade relations with Russia will likely continue and expand;
- Although the volume of oil products imported from Russia is high and logical, after the full implementation of EU sanctions, we will probably have to stop importing Russian oil from by the summer of 2023, so it is important to start the process of replacing Russian oil.
- The Russia-Ukraine war showed us that as a result of the increase in migration, within the framework of the increased demand We have to finance additional imports, It is clear that the production of food products is related to specific conditions, including the geographical environment, but it is possible to produce and export those goods that Georgia has the ability to produce, i.e. agricultural (natural) products. (it turned out that we have the potential to produce half of the total wheat consumption in Georgia), as a result of the increase in demand, the increase in the prices of already imported goods has a negative impact on the local resident consumer.
- The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war and migration on the economy of Georgia is obvious, the new geopolitical situation gives Georgia more opportunities in this regard due to its geographical location. Russia's

economy has a greater impact on Georgia's economy compared to Ukraine's, but this should not be seen as a positive event due to the unpredictability of Russia's actions. It may even be better for the perspective to distance the economy of Georgia from the economy of Russia (at least the latest developments show this). In addition, Georgia’s economic policy mustn’t be dictated by one-time injections (meaning the increase in migration and increased demand, as well as not reducing trade in the background of the war with Russia, but rather strengthening it), but rather by a long-term strategy. It is worth noting that economic stability and development are achieved through a strategic plan and not a one-time action. In addition, the current situation significantly increases the political-economic role of Georgia, especially for Europe, so it will become necessary to distance Georgia’s economic policy from the Russian Federation, as an unpredictable economy.

In parallel with the economic challenges, the migration processes in Georgia contains significant threats in the military and political context:

1. The inflow of Russian money continues, bypassing international sanctions. Under oligarchy, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s informal rule of Georgia in fact, has become a "Sanitary Cordon for the Transferring sanctioned money" from Russia to Georgia and then worldwide, which causes significant damage to the country's image in the eyes of Western partners. European partners actively accuse the current Georgian Dream government that they "Profiting from the War".
2. Parallel to the massive influx of Russian citizens, it becomes difficult to control and prevent the entry of intelligence or subversive groups. These groups may be used to provoke subversive acts or a politically unstable situation in the country. There is a high risk of provoking violence against Russian citizens now living in Georgia, which the Kremlin may use for military intervention.
3. Risks of confrontation between Ukrainian refugees and groups of migrating Russian citizens. In an interview with " European Pravda", Acting Ambassador of Ukraine to Georgia Andrey Kasyanov said that the Embassy of Ukraine does not exclude the evacuation of Ukrainian citizens from Georgia if they are in danger in case of resumption of direct air connection between Moscow and Tbilisi.
4. The growth of transnational crime related to “Fishing”, Cyber-Crimes, Cyber-Fraud, drug distribution and etc.
5. Parallel to the massive influx of citizens from Russia, there is a mass outflow of Georgian citizens as labor migrants, which is mainly flowing to the EU countries, the US, and Canada. Among the Labor Migrants from Georgia are citizens under 50 years old, and their migration has both short-term and long-term aims. Moreover, there is also a high willingness among the European countries and the US, among certain age and both gender groups from Georgia, is increasing for socio-economic and various political reasons, both in the short-term and in the long-term perspective. The desire to immigrate from Georgia is also high among the population inhabiting main cities or the countryside. NDI and CRRC research for 2023 reveals that every five citizens under the age of 50 (mostly men) are considering leaving the country and moving for labor purposes. According to statistical data, 88,561 citizens left the country in 2021 due to the decrease in birth rate compared to the death rate, as a result of which the population of Georgia decreased by 400,000 in 2022 compared to 2021. The existing demographic and migration situation poses a significant challenge to the security of the country. Men under the age of 50 represent the vitally important assets for defense and security, but unfortunately, they are leaving Georgia for a better life.

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