

THE ROLE OF W. OCCAM'S CONCEPT OF SUPPOSITION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LINGUISTIC THINKING

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Abstract: W. Ockham's philosophical-logical concept is a factor of scientific thinking. In the 14th century, by studying a small academic resource, the English philosopher developed a conceptual vision of the relationship between the world, thought, and language, differing from Aristotle's. W. Ockham did not create a global philosophical theory; he will take his place on the Olympus of science with specific creativity - the logical analysis of signs and suppositions. The result obtained was ahead of its time and therefore remained without proper assessment for centuries. W. Ockham's thought will become truly relevant and in demand only in the 20th century. Representatives of linguistic philosophy, including followers of J. Moore, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, and J. Austin, conduct philosophical research on the world, such as W. Ockham, through the logical analysis of small linguistic material in many countries. The logical analysis of language in the works of L. Wittgenstein and J. Austin laid the foundation for linguistic pragmatics. The article evaluates the prehistory that led to W. Occam's concept, discusses the principles of language analysis, and studies the path of development of the author's ideas in science.

Keywords: Supposition, denotative expression, non-denotative expression, true assertion, false assertion, categorial words, syncategorematic words, absolute signs, connotative signs.

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Introduction. All fields of science represent the ideas of many people organized into a system. The system, as is known, assigns value to its parts (ԼՍԽՆՅՐՈՒ, 2002, թ. 121). In science, the highest value goes to the works of authors who establish the conceptual foundation and methodology of the field.

W. Occam's attempt in his "Logic" to establish the real signs between words and expressions for the purpose of knowing the world goes beyond the ancient tradition in this field. However, W. Occam does not announce a new logic project, nor does he promise us another theory of knowledge; he claims to make a change in the philosophical practice of establishing truth, which meant only an addition to Aristotle's logic. At the same time, the addition concerned the relationship between the world, thinking, and language, which are the basis of all theories. The slightest change here can lead to a qualitative transformation of the theory. W. Ockham can be compared to a railway conductor who diverted the train to another track without having imagined its further route. W. Ockham's "Logic" is not a programmatic work. None of the philosophers has assessed it as a new stage of philosophical thinking. Linguists, for obvious reasons, have refrained from discussing the philosopher's thought in detail. But philosophical work not only can conceptually enrich other fields, but is also called upon to do so. What is it about W. Ockham's thought that has subsequently laid the foundation for the scientific work of others?

Methods. To evaluate W. Occam's philosophical-logical concept, we used two principles: 1. A prominent theory does not begin in the author's work, 2. A prominent theory does not end in the author's work; this

determined the direction of the research: the history of scientific thought and the method: comparative logical-linguistic analysis of relevant scientific works.

Discussion. No matter how original, a scientific theory does not begin with the author's work. An outstanding researcher is always the best student. And ideas have a history of formation. Therefore, it is important to note the academic environment in which W. Occam worked in the 14th century. He is a representative of the Oxford philosophical school, in which, along with the sophisticated logical reasoning of John Dun Scott, Robert Grosseteste recognized inductive analysis as a necessary part of research and, with the support of Adam Marsh, directed scientific research to trial; here, Roger Bacon introduced experiment into practical philosophy, and William Sherwood considered logic as a supporting discipline for other sciences. This created a clear dissonance in the discourse of medieval scholastics on Aristotle's logic, which was followed by Peter of Spain's attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to create a new logic. W. Ockham finds another basis for his concept in the speculative grammar of the Modists (Thomas of Erfurt, John Daniel, Simon Daniel...). The Modists supported Aristotle, who allowed for a structural analogy (ozomorphism) between the world, thought, and language. In their opinion, since the mind creates language, the latter contains deep-seated basic logical principles that connect language with thought, and thus with the world. Speculative grammar aimed to determine the logical in language. This could be achieved through the logical analysis of language. W. Occam will use the analytical apparatus of the Modists, as well as the practice of considering the suppositions of Peter the Spaniard, but to establish the truth of statements. Unlike the Modists, W. Occam will not agree with Aristotle. The Stagirian was the first to draw attention to the fact that the correctness of thinking can be violated by the polysemy of words. Therefore, he will base logic not on the content of the statement, but on the structure of thought, which is not subject to subjective change. For all utterances of "predicate" speech, Aristotle establishes a formal sign - assertion. The figures of syllogisms presented in the *Analytics* do not contain any specific content about the world: "If A does not coincide with any B, then B does not coincide with any A; If A coincides with some B, then B also coincides with some A. If A is said about all B, and B about all V, then A is said about all V..." (Аристотель, 1978, стр. 121, 123). Aristotle's formal logic is an objective tool of thought because it excludes the subjective semantics of words. This leads us to believe that only a logical structure ensures correct thinking. In contrast, W. Ockham explores the semantic factor of the truth of thought. Indeed, Aristotle's syllogisms are devoid of specific semantics outside of speech, and when used, the place of symbols (A, B, V...) is taken by words with a certain semantics.

According to W. Occam, the ancient truth that names express ideas and denote things (Платон, 1968, стр. 422) requires clarification. The English philosopher recognizes concepts (ideas) as natural signs of things and words as artificial signs. Natural signs (concepts) are primary; they cannot replace the thing they denote. Created signs (words), on the contrary, can replace the thing. Thus, a word is a changeable sign; logic must take this into account. Since physical objects are replaced by their signs (words) in a statement, the truth of the statement depends, among other conditions, on how the word replaces the thing. The statement "Man is God" is true if the word "man" refers to one person—the Lord Jesus Christ—and would be false if the same word refers to all people (Оккам, 2002, стр. 31).

Thus, the same word can denote a different number of objects; that is, in modern terminology, it can have different extensions. In addition, a word can be used not only in relation to the physical world. The Christian philosopher Peter of Spain named the semantic change of words resulting from these factors as supposition (substitution). According to his observations, the word "man" can denote:

1. A material but non-spiritual object: "A person is a name"
2. A single physical object: "This person is running"
3. An indefinite object: "A person is running"

4. A multiple object: "A person should be happy"

5. A general mental object: "A person is a face"

(Шишков, 2016, стр. 402).

Peter is a Spanish realist: he allows the existence of concepts (universals) in reality. For him, in the statement "A man is a face," the word "man" denotes a truly existing object. Therefore, when establishing truth, all suppositions are equally real and do not require additional conditions. The nominalist W. Ockham does not consider a concept and a word to be real physical objects. According to his assessment, in the statement "A man is a face," the word "man" denotes a concept but does not denote a real object; similarly, in the statement "A man is a name," the word "man" denotes a word and does not denote a real object. While a denoting statement must contain a word—a sign (Оккам, 2002, стр. 7-32). The English philosopher studies cases of suppositions in order to distinguish between denoting and non-denoting expressions. Therefore, for him, the relationship between suppositions is hierarchical:

1. Personal: the word refers to a single signifier (object, property, concept, or word) and is a sign: "Every person is a living being," "Every name is a part of speech," "Every concept is general."

2. Simple: the word refers to a concept but does not refer to it: "A person is a concept."

3. Material: the word refers to a word but does not refer to it: "A person is a name."

Other suppositions (discrete, general, vague, definite, movable, immovable, distributed) are variants of the personal supposition (Оккам, 2002, стр. 32-45); Of these, the discrete (which singles out a single signifier with a proper noun or demonstrative pronoun: "Socrates is wise," "This man is a philosopher") and the general (which denotes multiple signifiers: "A man is a living being") semantically change meaning, while the rest should be of interest to the logic of predicates.

Thus, language produces more statements than are necessary for cognition of the world, because along with designating physical reality, language designates its structure and forms of thought ("intentions of the soul"). It is not difficult to distinguish statements about the world, thought, and language from each other if the corresponding words are used in them, for example, 1. "Socrates is a philosopher." 2. "Thought is a predication." 3. "The adverb does not change." The above statements are true in the subject-subject domain. The problem arises when, in material and simple suppositions, words that do not denote language and thought are used, respectively, for example, "A man is a name" and "Runs is a predicate." It is clear that "A man" cannot be a "name" in the literal sense, just as "Runs" denotes the corresponding action and not a "predicate." Aristotle's logic cannot distinguish between the statements: 1. "Socrates is a philosopher." 2. "Socrates is a name." 3. "Socrates is a subject of reasoning." According to W. Occam, in the first statement, the word "Socrates" denotes an object of the world; we have a personal supposition, which can be true. In the second statement, "Socrates" denotes a word but does not denote anything; the supposition is material, and the statement cannot be true or false. Similarly, in the third statement, "Socrates" denotes a part of thought but does not denote anything; the supposition is simple, which also cannot be true or false. According to W. Occam's "logic," in order to determine the truth of a statement, it is necessary to know to which sphere—the physical world, language, or thinking—it is applied. Otherwise, the statement cannot be true or false, for example, "the philosopher has not changed," "a person remains in his place," or "the animal has moved forward." Examples given as personal suppositions may be true; in the case of simple and material suppositions, they are neither true nor false.

According to W. Occam, cognition is carried out by signs, including words, if they are signs. The analysis of assumptions showed the English philosopher that not all words included in an expression denote the constituent parts of the physical world: objects and properties. Following W. Sherwood, he calls such words syncategorematic (verbs, objects, conjunctions, prepositions, interjections, some nouns). The listed words are

used in conjunction with categorial words that denote objects of the physical world, for example, "person", "animal", "whiteness", "white", "color" (Оккам, 2002, стр. 11-13).

Since a property is inconceivable without an object, its expressive name also denotes two objects, an object and a property at the same time. Therefore, W. Ockham divides categorial words into absolute and connotative (Latin *connotare* "to denote") signs. The first denote one object (an object: "person", "tree" or a property: "whiteness", "sweetness"), the second - two (an object and a property) at the same time, for example, "white", "sweet", "human", "reason", "form". W. Ockham's philosophical-logical taxonomy of words also takes into account their sphere of application (physical, linguistic, mental). He distinguishes between the case of primary imposition, when words denote physical objects and concepts, and secondary imposition, when the objects of the words are the words themselves, for example, "name", "pronoun", "verb", "turn", "kilo" (Оккам, 2002, стр. 19). Words of secondary imposition are used mainly in grammar.

Words of primary imposition, in turn, are divided into names of primary intention, which denote real objects ("person", "stone", "white") and names of secondary intention - "mental terms", which denote concepts: "face", "genus", "universal"...etc. (Оккам, 2002, стр. 21).

Language is a system independent of logic, therefore the logical analysis of language, whether carried out for the needs of logic or grammar, cannot be perfect. W. Ockham is a philosopher, he needs knowledge about signs to study the world. That is why the presented classification is based on the ability to name signs (reference). The evaluation of signs is also hierarchical, the main place is given to the categorial words denoting the physical world: "man", "animal", "whiteness", "white"... But the mentioned and other nouns and adjectives in simple and material suppositions, according to the author, lose the function of a sign: "man is a name", "animal is a concept", "white turns". Thus, according to W. Ockham, words denoting real objects ("human", "animal", "whiteness", "white"...) sometimes denote and sometimes do not denote real objects, therefore, their unilateral recognition as categorial signs according to reference is incorrect.

Conclusions. The above and even other possible remarks cannot detract from the main point of W. Ockham's work: many original ideas:

The formation of reasoning is not a purely logical, but a logical-linguistic act;

The names that, together with the corresponding concepts, take part in the construction of reasoning, reflect reality differently in different cases of use;

The truth of a statement also depends on how the sign replaces the object;

The same name is used differently in statements in terms of reference to the world and, on the other hand, to thinking and language.

A statement cannot be true if the word included in it in the position of the subject does not denote an object (is not a sign);

Cognition is carried out by signs: concepts, words, and statements;

Not all words are signs;

A sign is not a sign in all cases of use.

Language is not a perfect means of cognition: along with true assertions, it also produces false assertions.

An assertion can be: 1. true, 2. false, 3. neither true nor false.

Logic requires the study of the use of signs.

P.S. Original ideas create theories. In the first half of the 19th century, W. Humboldt formulated an anthropological theory of language that laid the foundation for modern linguistics. According to the German linguist, a person thinks through language: "Language begins directly and simultaneously with the first act of reflection (thinking - L. Kh.)" (Гумбольдт, 1984, p. 301). The discovery of the participation of language in thinking began with W. Occam.

Traditional science is based on the teachings of Aristotle, who offers a scientific picture of the world and a methodology for studying it without taking into account the linguistic factor. In the 20th century, representatives of linguistic philosophy B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, J. Austin and their followers considered the logical analysis of language to be a necessary condition for studying the world. According to J. Austin, it is fundamentally important for philosophical research to distinguish true statements (statements) from false statements (Остин, 1986, стр. 25). J. Austin will continue the work begun by W. Occam and discover performatives - in the form of narrative sentences that do not tell us anything, nor do they prove anything, and therefore cannot be true or false, for example, "I agree to marry this woman", "I apologize", "I congratulate you on your success", "I declare a protest"... (Остин, 1986, стр. 27). Like W. Occam, J. Austin also explores the problem of the truth of the statement and makes a second discovery: many narrative sentences are not always used with an affirmative function, for example, "The cat is on the carpet" 1. The cat is on the carpet (affirmative), 2. Get the cat off the carpet! (non-affirmative) (Остин, 1986, стр. 115). Let us recall W. Occam: a sign is not a sign in all cases of use (Оккам, 2002, стр. 5). According to L. Wittgenstein, language masks the logical form of propositions, which makes it difficult to study facts (Витгенштейн, 1994, p. 32). As a result of logical analysis, L. Wittgenstein divides propositions into three groups: 1. Synthetic: can be true or false 2. Analytic: always true 3. Metaphysical: neither true nor false, because they describe non-existent facts. Metaphysical propositions constitute traditional philosophy (Витгенштейн, 1994, p. 25). Neither true nor false statements first appeared in W. Ockham's simple and material assumptions. The work of L. Wittgenstein and J. Austin gave rise to linguistic pragmatics, the founding father of which is W. Occam.

Only in the second half of the 20th century did linguists recognize a sentence as a sign, a fact discovered by W. Occam in the 14th century.

The main idea of W. Occam's concept: "Logic requires the study of the use of signs," remained unchallenged for centuries. It is known that the founder of semiotics, C. Peirce, actually set himself the goal of creating semiotic logic (the logic of signs) in the second half of the 19th century (Пирс, 2000, стр. 325). The classification of signs given within the framework of this initiated project is universal for all branches of science. But the main postulate of his "formal semiotics" remained unclear to C. Peirce: the mind directs thinking through signs, and not through ideas (Plato) or words (Humboldt). W. Ockham showed us that the mind conceives of an object by ideas and words if they are signs, that is, the mind operates only by signs.

Thus, W. Ockham's work has a continuation. The emerging theory does not begin and does not end with the author's work.

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